Replication material for: Schib, Tobias & Stutzer, Alois. What Contributes to an Attractive Local Political Office? Evidence from Municipal Council Elections in Switzerland

Federal democracies rely on active local political participation, yet both anecdotal and empirical evidence from Western democracies highlight increasing challenges in recruiting municipal candidates in recent decades. This study provides systematic and long run empirical evidence on this issue for Switzerland, analyzing data spanning municipal council elections across 500+ municipalities of three major Swiss cantons since the 1970s. Using a subsample analysis in the canton of Lucerne, we apply two-way fixed effects models to analyze the impact of monetary compensation and (expected) workload on the number of candidates and the fluctuation rate in municipal councils, drawing on the economic theory of political selection. Our findings show that higher salaries are not associated with more competitive local elections or longer terms in office. However, reducing the workload associated with municipal mandates appears to be a more effective strategy for increasing candidate supply, particularly in recruiting women.